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JEFFREY G. MILLER* 
Defending 'Superfund and RCRA 
Imminent Hazard Cases 
The federal government may seek an injunction to abate the release of a 
hazardous waste to the environment under the Comprehensive Environ- 
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund)' or 
to abate a threat to public health or the environment from hazardous wastes 
under the imminent and substantial endangerment provisions of the other 
environmental statutes, including the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA).= The states may seek comparable action under their own 
authorities.Vnder Superfund, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has the option either (1) to issue an administrative order or to seek an 
injunction ordering responsible parties to prevent or mitigate a release of 
hazardous substances to the environment,' or (2) to perform the action 
itself and later seek reimbursement of its costs from the responsible parties.' 
To obtain relief under the more limited imminent and substantial endanger- 
ment provisions, EPA must show that the release endangers or threatens to 
endanger public health or the environment. Under these provisions EPA 
does not have authority to perform the required action itself and later seek 
reimbursement .6 
Developing strategies to defend these cases is complicated by am- 
biguities in the Superfund statute, the lack of reported cases, and am- 
bivalence in EPA's intentions. Despite uncertainties, however, several 
defenses suggest themselves from the face of the statutes, their legislative 
history, and the small body of case law. Moreover, various tactics suggest 
themselves from what is known of EPA's operations and philosophy. Com- 
~~ ~ ~~ 
'Partner, Bergson, Borkland, Margolis & Adler, Washington, D.C. 
'Pub. L. No. 96-150, 94 Stat. 2767, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 5  9601 et seq. 
'Section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6973 (1976 and Supp. 111 1979); 8 303 of the Clean 
Air Act, 42 id. 8 7603; 8 504 of the Clean Water Act, 33 id. 8 1364; 5 1431 of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 id. 1 300; and 8 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Acts, I5 id. 8 2606. 
'See, e.g., ~ a t ' l  wood preserves, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental ~esources,-14 ERC 1486 
(Pa. 1980). 
'pub: L. No. 96-510, !j 106, 94 Stat. 2767, 2780, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 9606. 
'Pub. L. No. 96-510, 8 107, 94 id. at 2782, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 9607. 
?3uch action is possible pursuant to 31 1 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1321 (1976 
and Supp. I11 1979), and was possible under 8 504(b) of that act, a section that was never 
funded and was repealed by 8 304(a) of Superfund. 
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bined, these defenses and tactics allow development of successful and 
sometimes imaginative defense strategies. Most of the defenses and tactics 
apply equally to state cases, although the applicable statutory framework 
may vary. The type of inquiry suggested here should be useful in developing 
a defensive strategy for any hazardous waste case in which the government 
is the plaintiff. 
The successful defense of these cases begins with early identification of 
suspected government actions and development of strategies to deal with 
them. Failure to act quickly may foreclose both tactical and strategic op- 
tions. Failure to demand split samples from the moment the first govern- 
ment inspector appears, for example, will foreclose potential challenges to 
the government's evidence. Failure to deal with particularly toxic wastes as 
soon as their presence becomes known may foreclose the strategy of 
eliminating the endangering nature of a problem to avoid or lessen govern- 
ment involvement. 
Early development of a strategy involves a thorough knowledge of the 
facts of the case, a knowledge of possible legal defenses, and an ability to 
predict governmental concerns and actions. Since the facts will differ from 
case to case, no single strategy can be recommended although a number are 
suggested. The following discussion of possible legal defenses is by no 
means exhaustive. The government's announced intentions and attitudes 
are examined, together with some of the relevant forces at work on and in 
the government. From considering the facts, possible defenses, are probable 
government reactions, strategies can be developed and tactics employed. 
I. POSSIBLE LEGAL DEFENSES 
Defenses may vary depending on the relief sought by the government. The 
government may seek to recover expenditures for removal or remedial 
measures it took under Superfund. It also may seek remedial action under 
Superfund or under one of the emergency provisions of other environmen- 
tal statutes. Tactical options may differ, depending on whether action is be- 
ing sought by administrative order or by injunctive relief. A number of 
defenses are common to all situations. 
A. Common Defenses 
1. NO IMMINENT OR SUBSTANTIAL 
ENDANGERMENT 
Proof that public health or the environment is endangered is a prerequisite 
to use of one of the emergency provisions, but not of Superfund, which 
depends only upon the release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance. It is discussed as a common defense because the degree and im- 
minence of endangerment are factors which a judge will consider in any re- 
quest for an injunction and which EPA must take into account in framing 
its actions under Superfund. 
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The degree of imminence and seriousness of endangerment that the 
government must prove varies from statute to  statute and each should be 
looked at with care.' The government generally must show that one or more 
hazardous substance is being released, migrating on an exposure route, and 
reaching a predictable number of people on whom it is having a predictable 
adverse health impact or that such chain of events is probable in the future 
unless remedial action is taken. This causation chain may be attacked in 
several places. The credibility of the government's evidence should be 
carefully e ~ a m i n e d . ~  The migration route, particularly if it is underground, 
may be highly questionable. The potential damage caused if exposure does 
result will often be open to substantial q u e ~ t i o n . ~  There is no unanimity in 
the scientific community on the use of animal data.to establish human car- 
cinogenicity or on the existence or level of a threshold for exposure before 
the danger of cancer exists. The government is reassessing its previous posi- 
tion that such data should be used and' that  no threshold levels can be 
established.I0 Expert opinions on both sides of these issues probably can be 
found within the plaintiff agency with regard to many chemicals it alleges to 
be toxic. The standards used for animal studies and epidemological studies 
are exacting and the scientific credibility of many studies on which experts 
base their opinions may be attacked. Comparisons with risks voluntarily or 
involuntarily born by the population at risk, such as smoking or remaining 
in the company of people who are smoking, may undercut the apparent 
severity of the projected risk. All of the problems of causation in this uncer- 
tain area are multiplied when the risk is in the future and speculative. 
Despite these difficulties, the government has been fairly successful in 
convincing judges of endangerments." Nevertheless, the argument is worth 
making. At the very least, doubts raised as to the seriousness of the en- 
dangerment may be reflected in the judge's ruling on the reasonableness of 
the remedy. This will vary considerably with the nature of the action taken 
or requested. If an apparent emergency exists and quick action is necessary, 
most judges will be more willing to defer to the government's judgment. 
However, in the remedial states, where there is time for study and analysis, 
judges should examine the government's judgment more critically. This is 
underscored by the statutory and regulatory structure governing EPA's 
responses under Superfund which require it to justify its actions with pro- 
gressively more care as the danger grows less immediate.12 
'See Skaff, The Emergency Powers in the Environmental Protection Statutes, 3 HARV. 
- ENV; L. REV. 298-325 (1979). 
'See text following note 19, infra. 
'See text following note 22, infra. 
''See Inside EPA, October 16, 1981, p. 12. 
"See Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Solvents Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 
1980); United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980); and United 
States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980). 
"See note 17, infra. 
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2. THE REMEDY IS INAPPROPRIATE 
The remedy may not really cure the alleged problem or may cause more 
problems than it solves.13 It may go beyond what is necessary to protect 
public health. Its costs may outweigh its benefits. There may be other more 
or equally effective remedies that cost less. In injunction cases courts must 
strike a balance of equities, even when the complained of activity is in viola- 
tion of a statutory mandate.14 These arguments are strengthened by the em- 
phasis placed on the cost effectiveness of remedies in Superfund.I5 
3. THE ACTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE 
NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 
Actions taken by EPA under Superfund are governed by the National Con- 
tingency Plan (NCP) required in section 105 of the act. Remedial actions 
which EPA wishes to  undertake or for which it seeks reimbursement and en- 
forcement actions which it takes are all variously governed by the NCP.16 
EPA's enforcement under the emergency provisions of the other en- 
vironmental statutes is affected by the NCP, both because section 106(c) of 
Superfund requires EPA to establish guidelines for such enforcement con- 
sistent with the NCP and because the NCP is the most comprehensive, ex- 
plicit, and current policy statement by the government on the manner with 
which such situations should be dealt. For the latter reason the standards 
for action established by the NCP can be used as a hallmark against which 
to judge the reasonableness of actions taken or demanded by other federal 
or state agencies. 
Although the NCP is regrettably vague in many material respects, it 
may be possible to argue that action taken or sought by EPA is beyond that 
authorized because the need for the action is less urgent than thought by 
EPA," the action is not cost-effective,I8 or the need for and costs of ac- 
- 
"SeeO'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 11 ELR 21005 (E.D. Pa. 1981). in which the court 
refused a requested injunction to close a leaking landfill because leachate would continue to 
escape after cessation of operation. Instead the court ordered the landfill to  develop and ex- 
ecute plans to stop leachate from escaping its boundaries. According to the defendant's 
counsel, the continued operation of the landfill was the only source of revenue to correct the 
environmental harm it was found to  have caused. 
"Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982). 
"See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 5 105(7), 94 Stat. 2767, 2 7 9 ,  to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
5 9605(7), and 40 C.F.R. 5 300.68(g)-(j), 47 Fed. Reg. 3 1217 (July 16, 1982). 
16EPA is authorized to take remedial or removal actions only if they are consistent with 
the NCP, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 5 104(a), 94 Stat. 2767, 2774, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
5 9604(a). It can secure reimbursement of expenditures for remedial actions only if they are 
consistent with the NCP under 5 107(a) of Superfund. EPA's enforcement of Superfund is im- 
pliedly to  be consistent with the NCP. See note 4, supra. 
"Immediate removal, planned removal, and remedial actions are authorized for descend- 
ing levels of imminence of hazard. Since there are differing restrictions on EPA's authority to  
act under each of these various levels, wrongful classification of imminence could result in 
unauthorized government action. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 5 104,94 Stat. 2767,2774-79, to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 9604, and 40 C.F.R. 5G300.64 to .68,47 Fed. Reg. 31214-17 (July 16, 
1982). 
"See note 15, supra and 40 C.F.R. 5 300.68(g)-(j), 47 Fed. Reg. 31217 (July 16, 1982). 
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complishing the action are insufficiently documented.19 
4. EVIDENCE IS NOT CREDIBLE OR SUFFICIENT 
Underlying all of these cases will be evidence based on sampling and 
analysis, much of it performed by contractors and states. It can be attacked 
on grounds of credibility and sufficiency. 
Questions of credibility go to whether the evidence is reliable. Were the 
samples put in containers that were properly cleansed and not likely to con- 
taminate the samples? Were the samples properly preserved and chilled? 
Were the samples representative of the discharge, emission, or release? 
Were they taken by trained and qualified personnel? If taken by automatic 
sampling equipment, was it properly calibrated and routinely checked for 
proper operation? Were the samples properly stored in the laboratory? 
Were they analyzed within the proper holding time? Were they analyzed us- 
ing standard methods? Were they analyzed by trained and qualified person- 
nel? Were the analytical instruments properly calibrated? Did the 
laboratory follow adequate quality control procedures? Did it follow quali- 
ty control procedures established by the agency? Had the laboratory been 
audited and rated for quality control? Were different results on split 
samples obtained by other laboratories? Were adequate chain-of-custody 
procedures followed throughout the taking and analysis of the samples? 
These inquiries may lead to surprising results. For example, in United States 
v. Moss-American, I ~ C . ~ O  the government's case was dismissed when 
discovery turned up falsified chain-of-custody tags revealing that a relevant 
sample had not been taken at the location represented by the government. 
A similar series of questions can be raised on the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Were samples taken fully representative of the conditions they 
purport to represent? Were enough samples taken to be statistically signifi- 
cant? Were they taken in enough locations to preclude other conclusions be- 
ing drawn? Were they taken over a sufficient length of time to be relevant? 
Were the same analytical methods used on all samples? Were the same 
analytical methods used as were used to establish any relevant comparative 
benchmark, e.g., a standard or threshold level of risk?21 What is the 
predicted range of error in the analytical method?22 
5.  SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT CREDIBLE 
Scientific conclusions are normally drawn by expert witnesses and 
countered by other expert witnesses. The credibility of the government's ex- 
perts may be undercut by questioning the validity of studies on which the 
opinion is based or by establishing that the government in other contexts 
does not act as if it believed its expert's opinion. 
" See 40 C.F.R. 4 300.69, 48 Fed. Reg. 31217-18 (July 16, 1982). 
1°78 F.R.D. 214 (E.D. Wisc. 1978). 
"See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
"See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 502 F.2d 722, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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The studies on which expert opinions are based should bk examined to 
determine whether they were carried out using accepted methods; were sub- 
ject to peer review; are generally accepted by the relevant scientific commu- 
nity; and are supported or questioned by other studies. The studies should 
be examined critically using many of the questions suggested above regard- 
ing credibility and sufficiency of evidence. Methodologies in particular 
should be viewed skeptically. 
If the government does not act consistently with its expert's opinion in 
other contexts, it can be argued that the government does not believe the 
opinion is credible. This argument is particularly appealing if the plaintiff 
agency does not act consistently with the opinion. If the opinion, for in- 
stance, is that chemical X poses a risk of cancer at certain exposures, does 
the agency regulate X in other contexts? Does it regulate the chemical to 
prevent the exposures suggested? Are there important scientific officials in 
the agency who do not agree that the chemical poses a risk of cancer at those 
levels? 
6. GOVERNMENT ACTION PRECLUDES THE 
RELIEF 
Reliance on past government action sanctioning or acquiescing in the now 
complained of behavior will sometimes estop government a c t i ~ n . ~ '  Pending 
state action may support federal judicial abstention or a stay of federal pro- 
ceeding~.~' Indeed, pending state action may cause the Department of 
Justice to decline federal p rosecu t i~n .~~  A final adjudication in state court 
may be afforded full faith and credit,26 or may result in collateral estoppelz7 
which suggests there may be an advantage to being sued in a relatively 
friendly forum or perhaps by a relatively friendly governmental plaintiff. 
Collusive consent decrees, however, will not be afforded great deference.18 
B.  Defenses to Superfund Reimbursement Claims 
1 .  DEFENDANT NOT AMONG CLASS OF 
LIABLE PARTIES 
Superfund liability for reimbursement extends only to four classes of par- 
ties: (1) owners and operators of the facility; (2) owners and operators of 
the facility at the time the complained of hazardous substance was disposed 
there; (3) persons who arranged for disposal or transport for disposal of the 
hazardous substance at the facility; or (4) persons who transported the 
"United States v. Pennsylvania Engineering Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973), and 
United States v. Martin, 517 F. Supp. 21 1 (D.S.C. 1981). 
I4United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). 
"See Dept . of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution, pp. 1 1-12 (1980). 
I6Menzel v. County Utilities Corp., 501 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
"United States v.  ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1980). 
"See note 24, supra. 
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hazardous substance and selected the facility for disposal. Only persons 
falling into one of these categories are liable under section 107 of the act, 
although generators of hazardous waste could fall within any of these 
categories. 
2. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND THE 
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTIONz9 
The potentially liable owners, operators, and transporters at a typical un- 
controlled hazardous waste site are often thinly capitalized or insolvent. 
Records may identify many generators but not all of them. Some will be in- 
solvent or no longer exist. Of the existing solvent generators, a few will have 
together generated more than half the wastes by volume but most will have 
generated insignificant amounts by volume. The degree of hazard of the 
wastes will vary greatly and have no relation to the volume generated. 
Remedial actions at larger sites can cost several million dollars and they can 
escalate quickly if groundwater contamination must be halted. 
The liability dilemma is apparent in the typical situation. Common-law 
liability generally attaches for damages or expenditures linked directly to 
the defendant. Thus, following the general common-law rule, a generator 
would be liable only for remedial costs proven to be associated with its 
wastes. If joint and several liability applies, any generator could be liable 
for the entire remedial costs, regardless of the size of its contribution to the 
problem. If a right to contribution exists, the jointly and severally liable 
generator can recover portions of the costs from other generators. Both 
liability models have problems, and Superfund does not clearly embrace 
either of them. The different consequences flowing from them suggest dif- 
ferent defense strategies for generators. 
Most generators would prefer traditional common-law liability, under 
which they are liable for costs of remedial actions directed only at their 
wastes, greatly minimizing their liability. But the traditional liability model 
makes any recovery so difficult, it appears inconsistent with the remedial 
nature of Superfund. To establish the liability of a generator in the typical 
multigenerator situation, the government must isolate that generator's 
waste and prove that its wastes were released. Where several generators 
disposed of the same type of waste, this may be impossible. Even where that 
can be done, apportioning the cleanup costs spent for removal of that par- 
ticular waste may be impossible if the same action would have been taken in 
any event to remove other types of wastes. 
If the joint and several liability model is used, other unacceptable 
results occur. A generator could be liable for the costs of all remedial work, 
''This section of the paper is digested, with the kind permission of the publishers, from a 
fuller discussion of the subject by the author, entitled, "Superfund, Who Pays? The Elusive 
Issues of Joint and Several Liability and the Right to Contribution," Environmental Analyst, 
September, 1982, pp. 3-5. 
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despite the fact that other generators of greater volumes of similar or more 
noxious wastes were equally responsible for releases resulting in Superfund 
action. Indeed, under a literal reading of Superfund, a generator might be 
liable even if its hazardous waste or the type of waste generated by it is not 
being released from a site, as long as some type of hazardous waste is being 
released. This cause may be the proverbial red herring, however, since it 
presents the most compelling facts for a court to decide against joint and 
several liability and, as such, is an extremely unlikely case for the govern- 
ment to pursue. 
If a right to contribution against other generators exists, the severity of 
joint and several liability is much diluted. But contribution has difficulties. 
How are costs apportioned among generators? By volume? If so, who pays 
for the volume from unknown or insolvent generators? Should generators 
pay as much for a barrel of dioxin as for a barrel of relatively innocuous 
waste? Should contribution be pro rata despite differences between the 
generators? 
Contribution can never make a jointly liable defendant whole. It must 
incur legal and other expenses defending an action by EPA and prosecuting 
actions against other generators, none of which will normally be reim- 
bursable. Moreover, it will bear the burden of proof in prosecuting the con- 
tribution actions. Most of the evidence needed will be in possession of the 
government or its witnesses and once EPA has recovered from the generator, 
EPA's further interest in the matter will cool dramatically, even if it promises 
to cooperate. 
Superfund does not explicitly adopt either traditional common-law or 
joint and several liability. But the statute's structure suggests joint and several 
liability. Section 107 establishes that "any" person in the classes listed is liable 
and joins the classes with the conjunctive "and." It establishes no principle of 
apportioning liability for cleanup costs, which would be necessary to imple- 
ment common-law liability. At the same time as part of a last minute com- 
promise to secure enactment, Congress did remove from the Superfund bill a 
clause specifically adopting joint and several liability.30 The significance of 
this is debatable, since the House bill had contained an apportionment prin- 
ciple that was also rejected.'' In place of a joint and several liability language, 
Congress substituted in section 101(32)'2 a definition of "liability" constru- 
ing the term as the standard of liability under section 31 1 of the Clean Water 
Act, the oil spill cleanup provision on which Superfund is modeled. In so 
doing Congress had in front of its letters from the Justice Department and the 
Coast Guard (which administers the oil spill program), assuring it that section 
' T e e  126 CONG. REC. S14946 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph); 
HI 1787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio). 
"H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016.96th Cong., 2nd Sess. re~rinted in 1980 U.S.  CODE CODE &AD. 
- 
NEWS 6119, 6136. 
'=Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 9601(32). 
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31 1 provided joint and several liability." It seems what Congress took away 
with one hand, it gave back with the other.'* 
The standard of liability under section 31 1 of the Clean Water Act has 
been held to provide a right to cont r ibu t i~n , '~  which makes sense only in the 
context of joint and several liability. If section 3 1  1 does not provide suffi- 
cient guidance on the standard of liability under Superfund, the legislative 
history suggests looking to the common law.36 According to the Restate- 
ment (Second) of Torts, common law departs from its apportionment of 
liability and imposes joint and several liability where tortious conduct by 
two or more persons cause a single or indivisible harm. At the same time, it 
suggests that many environmental injuries are not single or indivisible." 
Although the issue is open to debate, Superfund will probably be construed 
to provide joint and several liability. 
A similar case can be made for the right to contribution. Since Super- 
fund does not explicitly adopt joint and several liability, it is, not surpris- 
ingly, silent on the right to contribution. It does preserve for liable parties 
any cause of action they may have by way of subrogation or otherwi~e. '~  In
the letter from the Department of Justice that was before Congress when it 
enacted Superfund, the department construed this savings clause as pro- 
viding a right to contribution. A similar savings clause in section 3 1  1 of the 
Clean Water Act has been held to provide a right to c~nt r ibu t ion . '~  If sec- 
tion 3 11 did not provide sufficient guidance on the issue and common law is 
looked to, the answer becomes murkier. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
supports contribution among joint t o r t f e a s ~ r s . ~ ~  But the Supreme Court 
has held in two recent cases that where a common law claim to contribution 
is sought under a federal statute and Congress has not provided for con- 
tribution or indicated that co.urts are free to develop substantive law, the old 
common law rule of no contribution will apply." The statutory references 
and congressional history discussed above, however, should be sufficient in- 
dication that Congress either intended to provide contribution or to allow 
"26 CONG. REC. HI1788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). 
"This statutory history is similar to RCRA's about which Judge Pollack wrote, "With 
respect to this statute it is particularly hazardous to couch analysis in terms of what language 
Congress 'chose,' in view of the fact that the statute as finally enacted was a compromise ver- 
sion which went through both chambers with little chance for debate." O'Leary v. Moyers 
Landfill, Inc., 11 ELR 21005 at 21008, n. 6. 
"U.S. v. Bear Marine Services, 509 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. La. 1980). 
I6See legislative history cited in note 30, supra. 
3 7 R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  (SECOND) OF TORTS, $5 875 and 881, illustrations 1 and 2. 
"Pub. L. No. 96-510, 107(e)(l), 94 Stat. 2767, 2782 to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 
9607(e)(l). 
39U.S. v. Bear Marine Services, 509 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. La. 1980). 
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 886A. 
"Northwest Airline, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL/CIO, 451 U.S. 
77 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
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courts to develop it by way of substantive law, as they have in other 
specialized  context^.'^ 
3. THE RELEASE WAS CAUSED SOLELY BY 
ACT OF GOD, WAR OR THIRD PARTY 
These statutory defenses in section 107 of Superfund are the only defenses 
provided in what is otherwise aptly characterized as a "strict liability" 
statute." They are very like the defenses provided under section 31 1 of the 
Clean Water Act, except that negligence of the United States is not a 
defense under Superfund and the third-party defense under Superfund ex- 
cludes employees, agents, and independent contractors and requires the 
defendant to show that it took precautions against acts and omissions of 
third parties. The third-party defense has been narrowly construed under 
section 31 1, making the failure of a defendant to take preventive action a 
contributing cause to the act of a third party, thus defeating the sole cause 
component of the defen~e. '~ 
C. Defenses to Abatement Actions 
1 .  NO IRREPARABLE HARM, ADEQUATE 
REMEDY AT LAW 
Almost all of the actions for which the government seeks injunctive 
remedies at hazardous waste sites could be accomplished by others (in- 
cluding EPA, using Superfund appropriations), who could in turn sue the 
defendant for damages or reimbursement. Since this may be characterized 
as providing an adequate remedy at law, an argument can be made that 
equitable remedies should not be available. In United States v. Price4' the 
government sought a preliminary injunction under section 7003 of RCRA 
to (1) fund a study to determine appropriate remedial action for preventing 
the contamination of the Atlantic City water supply, and (2) provide alter- 
native water supplies for persons whose wells were already contaminated. 
The court denied the preliminary injunction on the basis that an adequate 
remedy was available at law by way of damages. Its opinion came close to 
relying on the distinction between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. 
The court expressed the belief that injunctive relief is appropriate only for 
action of which the defendant is uniquely capable. The argument has been 
"Kohn v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). cert. den. 421 U.S. 978 
(1975) (midair collision); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. La. 1979) (damages 
caused by violation of federal securities laws); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 
417 U.S. 106 (1974) (personal injury in admiralty). 
"Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. 
Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980). 
"Proctor Wholesale Co. v. United States, 11 E.R.C. 1383 (Ct. C1. 1978); Shell Pipe Line 
Corp. v. United States, 11 E.R.C. 1385 (Ct. CI. 1978) (act of God). 
" I  ELR 21047 (D.N.J. 1981). 
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explicitly or impliedly rejected in similar  case^.'^ Pressed to its extreme, the 
argument could eviscerate the injunctive provisions of Superfund and the 
imminent and substantial endangerment provisions of the other environ- 
mental statutes. But judges have a considerable amount of discretion in this 
area, as reiterated recently by the Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Romero- 
Bar~elo.~ '  And there are good arguments that the injunctive provisions in 
Superfund were intended for just these purposes. In any event, section 3013 
of RCRA" authorizes administrative orders for extensive monitoring to 
ascertain the extent and nature of contamination, which is the bulk of the 
study for which the injunction was unsuccessfully sought in Price. And the 
judge in the case acknowledged that irreparable harm need not be shown to 
enjoin further violation of one of the environmental statutes. Curiously, he 
found that hazardous waste was currently being disposed of in violation of 
RCRA, an action that could be enjoined, but failed to address the connec- 
tion or lack of connection between the enjoinable violation and the relief re- 
quested. In sum, the decision is too conservative and restrictive to be relied 
on in other cases. 
2. EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ARE NOT 
RETROSPECTIVE 
This argument is closely related to the one discussed above. The emergency 
provisions provide injunctive relief against present releases to the environ- 
ment, not for cleanup from releases that occurred before their enactment. 
Thus section 7003 of RCRA can be used to enjoin present disposal, but not 
to require cleanup from disposal prior to RCRA's enactment49 The argu- 
ment is undercut, however, if past disposal results in present releases, as in 
United States v. Price. 
11. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS 
The sources of information regarding the government's intentions are an- 
nounced policies and known actions. The recent paucity of both and the 
disparity between public pronouncements and known actions make it dif- 
ficult to discern the government's real intentions or its ability to accomplish 
its articulated intentions. 
A. Policies 
EPA's announced policy continues to be that all efforts, including enforce- 
"United States v. Solvents Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. 
Conn. 1980); United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980); and 
United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980). 
''102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982). 
'"2 U.S.C. 5 6933 (Supp. 111 1979). 
49See United States v. Price, supra. Contra, United States v. Solvents Recovery Service of 
New England, supra. 
'O11 ELR 21047 (D.N.J. 1981). 
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ment, should be made to induce responsible parties to perform remedial ac- 
tion at hazardous waste sites prior to using government funds. But it con- 
sistently expresses a preference to use less confrontational approaches to 
dispute resolution and its enforcement policies emphasize enforcement tools 
other than litigation. Administrative orders under section 7003 of RCRA 
are used in place of judicial action where there is a high degree of likelihood 
of compliance, but short time deadlines are allowed in negotiations leading 
up to them.5' In addition to embodying negotiated agreements in consent 
decrees or consent orders, EPA uses nonenforceable agreements with par- 
ticularly cooperative parties.52 The extent of releases given by the govern- 
ment in return for remedial action performed will be tailored to the extent 
of remedial action done and knowledge about present and future hazards at 
the site. EPA also uses administrative orders under section 3013 of RCRA 
to compel responsible parties to determine the nature and extent of con- 
tamination at hazardous waste sites, doing so in a manner calculated to in- 
duce communication with the parties and to create a favorable record in the 
case of subsequent non~ompliance.~' 
EPA takes a very broad and liberal position with regard to what con- 
stitutes an "imminent and substantial endangerment" for the purpose of 
seeking relief under the emergency provisions of the federal  statute^.^' 
B.  Known Actions 
Superfund cleanup actions are proceeding slowly. As of mid-1982, EPA 
had (1) obligated $62 million of $225 million available to it under Super- 
fund; (2) entered into implementing agreements with 20 states; and (3) ini- 
tiated remedial investigation/feasibility studies at 29 out of 115 priority sites 
and completed 8.55 It had referred 79 cases under RCRA and Superfund to 
the Department of Justice for civil prosecution, 22 of them since the begin- 
ning of 1981, and 13 cases for criminal prosecution. At the same time, states 
had commenced 55 civil and 15 criminal actions for hazardous waste prob- 
lems in 1981 and 1982. Although emphasizing "nonconfrontationa1" dis- 
pute resolution, EPA had not used administrative remedies to the same 
extent as litigation, issuing only 11 administrative orders under section 106 
""Issuance of Administrative Orders Under 5 7003 of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act," from Douglas MacMillan, Acting Director, Office of Waste Programs En- 
forcement, to Regional Enforcement Division Directors, Sept. 11, 1981. 
''See "Guidance on Hazardous Waste Site Settlement Negotiations," from William A. 
Sullivan, Jr., Enforcement Counsel, to Regional Counsels, Enforcement Division Directors 
and Superfund Coordinators, Dec. 18, 1981. 
'3"Issuance of Administrative Orders Under Section 3013 of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act," from Douglas MacMillan, Acting Director, Office of Waste Programs 
Enforcement, to regional enforcement directors, Sept. 11, 1981. 
""Standards of Proof for Hazardous Waste Enforcement. . . ," from Douglas Mac- 
millan, Acting Director, Hazardous Waste Enforcement Task Force, to various regional en- 
forcement officials, Jan. 25, 1980. 
"From testimony of Chris Hall before the Senate Environmental Pollution Subcommit- 
tee, as reported in Hazardous Waste News, August 9, 1982, p. 251. 
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of Superfund and sections 3013 and 7003 of RCRA. It had sent nearly 1500 
letters to owners, operators, and generators at 100 sites, notifying them 
of potential liabilities and encouraging them to reach prompt negotiated 
~et t lements .~~ 
In several sites where it has sent notice letters, its attention has been 
focused primarily on the relatively small number of generators responsible 
for the greatest part of the waste at the site (first-tier companies). It 
demands have led the first-tier companies to form steering committees to 
negotiate with EPA and with the other generators (second-tier companies) 
to reach an overall settlement. In cases where these negotiations have 
reached or approached fruition, the settlements have the following 
characteristics: 
1. A money payment is made by each settling company for accrued ex- 
penses and damages and perhaps for ascertainable future expenses 
and damages. The amounts paid are not graduated according to 
fault, toxicity, etc., except to arbitrarily reflect gross disparities, 
e.g., first-tier companies pay ten times the amount of second-tier 
companies. The amounts are set to total close to the full amount of 
expenses and damages if all first- and second-tier companies par- 
ticipate. It is as yet unclear how many of the potentially liable par- 
ties must participate and what percent of the costs their offer must 
cover for the government to accept the settlement. 
2. EPA gives the settling parties a release covering remedial or removal 
work for which expenses and damages are paid, but not covering 
other remedial or removal work. 
3. If EPA sues nonsettling generators and they successfully assert a 
right of contribution against the settling companies, EPA in essence 
indemnifies them against such payments. 
4. Some working relationship is established between EPA and the settl- 
ing parties for cooperation in future remedial work or in determin- 
ing whether future remedial work is necessary. 
This type of settlement is highly advantageous for settling companies, 
especially first-tier companies. It limits their liability at a low and afford- 
able level, often below the cost of litigation. It puts them in the best posture 
possible publicly under the circumstances. There are problems with the ap- 
proach, however, that may prevent it from becoming an enduring pattern. 
To remain attractive to the government, a large enough percentage of the 
generators must participate in the settlement to result in a significant re- 
coupment of the government's expenditures. But there will be a natural 
disinclination on the part of many generators to settle at an early date, par- 
ticularly among second-tier companies. Some believe their contribution to 
"From information supplied by EPA in response to  a joint request by the Chairmen of the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Transpor- 
tation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, dated June 15, 1982. 
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the problem is too small to warrant being sued if a significant settlement is 
reached with others. Some may feel they have good enough defenses to 
avoid being sued or to prevail if they are sued. To keep participation high, 
the government must quickly and aggressively enforce against nonpartici- 
pants. Indeed, it has made initial efforts to do so." But this will prove dif- 
ficult to continue if large numbers of potential defendants do not par- 
ticipate at various sites. EPA's actions to date do not evidence the speed or 
resolve necessary to assure the long-term viability of this approach. EPA's 
internal ability to develop and prosecute cases has been severely disrupted 
by the abolition of its Office of Enforcement and the fragmentation of its 
components between various program offices and the new Office of Legal 
and Enforcement Counsel. The number of attorneys in that office is being 
reduced substantially and resources requested for 1983 hazardous waste en- 
forcement will not permit significant new activity.s8 
111. FORCES AT WORK ON THE 
GOVERNMENT 
Both external political pressures and internal organizational pressures are 
relevant to EPA's hazardous waste enforcement effort. 
A. Political Pressures 
Democratic House Committees continually hold oversight hearings criticiz- 
ing EPA's slow action in combating hazardous waste problems. Environ- 
mental organizations, with quickly growing memberships, are focusing on 
EPA management as a cause celebre. The media is focusing on EPA's slow 
pace. COP vote counters are concerned over public opinion polls suggesting 
that the party may lose support if it is widely thought of as "soft" in environ- 
mental protection. The White House is rumored to have recently told the ad- 
ministrator that it wants EPA to maintain a higher enforcement profile. 
On the other hand, conservative senators and congressmen expect favors 
from EPA for their constituents, including the favorable exercise of enforce- 
ment discretion. States, the preferred partner in the new federalism, hold 
federal enforcement against their regulated public as anathema. 
B. Internal Pressure 
It is unclear to EPA staff whether its management desires a strong enforce- 
ment program, a weak one, or none at all. Signals, both by word and deed, are 
mixed. EPA's former administrator had clearly stated that she wanted a 
"See Hazardous Waste News, Aug. 16, 1982, p. 261, reporting that the Department of 
Justice sued five generators that had not participated in a $1.6 million settlement at the Bluff 
Road site near Columbia, South Carolina. 
'"983 resources for hazardous waste enforcement will permit handling of I S  ongoing 
judicial actions, initiating 10 new cases, issuing IS administrative orders and negotiating 14 
voluntary agreements. Hazardous Waste News, id. 
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meaningful enforcement program.59 and EPA's regional offices have 
reportedly been given quotas for producing cases. At the same time, the Of- 
fice of Enforcement has been dismembered, with its constituent parts 
distributed to other offices, requiring increased internal cooperation and 
coordination to produce cases. Enforcement resources are shrinking, adding 
to the difficulty of producing new cases. Uncertainty of management direc- 
tion often results in bureaucratic paralysis. The very slow pace of filing new 
cases suggests this result has occurred with EPA enforcement. 
IV. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN 
ADOPTING A STRATEGY 
In choosing a strategy, a potential defendant should consider the full range of 
strategies and tactics available, the possible legal defenses, and how each 
relates to the government's posture and concerns. The most important fac- 
tors, however, relate to  the merits of the case at hand and its potential impact 
on the defendant. How likely is the government to prevail? How big is the 
remedial price tag? Are there other potentially liable parties that may be sued 
or may be subject to contribution? Are there private parties with damage 
claims that could be aided by government investigation and discovery?60 Can 
costs be reduced with cooperation by devising and carrying out the remedial 
work yourself? How substantial is the potential liability in relation to your 
assets, cash flow, and opportunity costs? How can you best prevent an undue 
drain on management attention? How important is adverse publicity? How 
important are good relations with EPA, the Department of Justice, and 
counterpart state agencies? How important is the case to the government, and 
how well prepared is it? 
V. DEVISING THE STRATEGY 
The four basic strategies available in most cases are: 
1. Eliminating the problem before governmental involvement. 
2. Cooperating with the government in eliminating the problem. 
3. Resisting demands of the government. 
4. Steering a middle course. 
Eliminating the problem before significant government involvement is 
usually the least costly, least aggravating strategy. It is particularly attrac- 
tive if solution of a small part of the problem eliminates the endangerment. 
This reduces greatly the risk that the government will later seek resolution 
"See report of the administrator's admonition to her regional administrators, Inside 
EPA, May 7, 1982, p. 5 .  
601n United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 491 (W.D.N.Y. 
1981) a protective order was denied for materials produced during the government's discovery 
in the Love Canal cases on the grounds that use by private parties in damage cases was 
legitimate. 
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of the remaining nonendangering portion of the problem. This strategy may 
be impractical if the problem is offsite and there are too many other con- 
tributors to agree on a solution or if government becomes involved before a 
solution can be accomplished. 
Cooperation with the government is normally the next best strategy. It 
is particularly appropriate now, when EPA is anxious to settle disputes, 
show cleanup progress, and differentiate itself from what it views as overly 
litigious past administrations. Costs may be less if a contributor can per- 
form remedial work rather than ultimately reimbursing the government for 
its contractor's ~harges .~ '  The public record from investigation by the 
government and discovery available to private plaintiffs in potential private 
damage actions may be less. Cooperation does not forestall hard negotia- 
tion to minimize obligations. Cooperation is often frustrated by the govern- 
ment's inability to respond quickly or consistently, because of internal turf 
battles, organizational disruption, and changing policy. 
Resisting the government may avoid liability altogether. In today's 
climate it runs the risk of an irrational reaction by an EPA hard pressed to 
show a firm enforcement backbone. If the government makes a substantial 
commitment of will and resources to a case, it can be a formidable, but by 
no means unbeatable, litigator. Sometimes the delay secured by litigating 
may be worthwhile even if ultimately the litigation is lost. 
Steering a middle course is recommended only as an interim measure 
until a more definite strategy can be developed. 
VI. TACTICS 
Once a strategy has been chosen, it can be implemented by a variety of tac- 
tics. Many, especially legal defenses, have been previously discussed, others 
are suggested below. Although they may be most obvious for use when 
resisting government demands, a number of them are very useful in other 
contexts. The tactics which depend on intervention of others (e.g., Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), congressmen) may be difficult to effec- 
tuate for highly publicized cases, because of possible adverse political reper- 
cussions of appearing "soft" on hazardous waste. 
A. Exploiting Internal Agency Tension 
A case by the government may sometimes be stopped, diverted, or settled 
on favorable terms by circumventing the agency officials handling the mat- 
ter to deal with more favorably inclined superiors or colleagues. Direct ap- 
proaches to appointed agency officials have not often succeeded during past 
6'This is not always the case, however. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. U.S., 11 ERC 1981 
(Ct. Cls. 1978). In that case the government unsuccessfully argued against the size of an oil spill 
cleanup reimbursement award against it under 6 31 1(1)(1) of the Clean Water Act because the 
contractor which performed the work for the party seeking reimbursement charged the party 
more than the contractor normally charged the government for comparable work. 
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administrations, but there are indications that they may succeed more often 
during the present administration. If meetings are held with such officials in 
the absence of the government's case attorneys, there are often communica- 
tion breakdowns within the agency that confuse or disrupt the government's 
defenses. Another office within the agency also may be convinced that the 
government's proposed enforcement action is adverse to its interest. In such 
a case it may argue the potential defendant's interest within the agency or 
take an action that can be used defensively. 
For either of these approaches to be successful, the defendant must 
have legitimately arguable points and accurate information on the internal 
dynamics in the agency. It must know who to approach, when to approach, 
and how to approach. Whether or not successful, such an approach will 
alienate, intimidate, or possibly embolden the subordinate bureaucrats who 
are bypassed. These potential impacts should be assessed before the tactic is 
pursued. 
B. Exploiting Internal Administration 
Tensions 
The interest of other parts of the administration in a potential case may be 
great or nonexistent, depending on the facts of the case. Identifying such in- 
terest is limited only by imagination and the willingness to search. White 
House or OMB staff may be interested in policy issues or tales of woe, and a 
telephone call by them to the agency may have great impact. Another 
department of government will be interested only in issues that directly af- 
fect its interests or operations. It will have less impact on the agency than 
the White House or OMB, but can raise such issues to them. This approach 
can alienate or intimidate appointed agency officials, as well as subordinate 
bureaucrats and those outside the agency who are contacted or used. To be 
successful, there must be something legitimately arguable about the case to 
catch the interest of another part of government and the defendant must 
have accurate information on who is likely to be interested by the case, how 
much influence they are likely to have, and how to approach them. 
C .  Taking Advantage of Congress 
Someone in Congress will listen to  and support almost any issue or any per- 
son. Most congressional inquiries, however, are halfhearted, designed only 
to show a constituent the congressman is trying to protect its interest. Such 
approaches create more ill will in the agency than benefit. Finding a sym- 
pathetic congressman with appropriate leverage over the agency and suffi- 
cient persistence, is a difficult and sophisticated task. Leverage varies with 
timing. A congressman with no normal leverage over the agency may have 
tremendous leverage if his vote is needed on a closely contested bill 
desperately sought by the administration. Informal contact and inquiry, 
staff investigation, hearing, request for a General Accounting Office audit, 
investigation or report, legislative or appropriation action, legislative 
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history and other avenues are open to a persistent and well-situated con- 
gressman. The Department of Justice has continuously and rather unsuc- 
cessfully discouraged congressional contact with the agency once litigation 
is commenced. 
D. Exploiting Intergovernmental Tensions 
The administration of most environmental laws is highly federalized. The 
state/federal relationship is frought with tensions. In many cases it may be 
possible to convince one level of government to fight the battle for an in- 
dividual against another level. This may help in pursuing the other tactics 
suggested. Intergovernmental friction may give a good excuse for a 
bureaucrat along the chain of command who is not otherwise enthusiastic 
for a particular case or for conflict in general, to scuttle or settle a case. The 
risks in the tactic are alienation of the target agency and losing the 
significance of and control over the original issue in an escalating in- 
tergovernmental battle. 
E. Resisting Access and In formation Requests 
The inspection and information-gathering provisions of the various en- 
vironmental statutes enforce against refusal to provide requested informa- 
tion only through subsequent court action and do not authorize un- 
consented searches without warrants.62 There may be legitimate reasons to 
quash a warrant: the warrant is too vague or too broad; it was granted 
without probable cause and not as part of a neutral inspection scheme; or 
the search is not within the scope of the authorizing legislation. Information 
requests may be subject to a variety of defenses: the request is beyond the 
scope of the authorizing legislation; it has not been cleared or exempted by 
OMB pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980;63 or compiling it is 
so burdensome that the government should agree in advance to compensate 
for time spent and expenses incurred.64 If delay is advantageous, such 
legitimate defenses can provide delay if not ultimate satisfaction. 
F .  Preemptive Litigation 
Early attempts at declaratory judgment or injunctive relief to secure preen- 
forcement review of agency orders or halt enforcement did not fare well 
when attempted under federal environmental laws. However, the reasons 
for denying preenforcement review are specific to each case and reported 
62Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v.  Tivian Laboratories, 
Inc., 589 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1978); Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. 
REV. 1291 (1979). 
6344 U.S.C. $ 3501 et seq. 
6'See United States v. Tivian Laboratories, Inc., 589 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1978), in which the 
First Circuit denied a request for such relief but did not rule out the possibility of it in another 
case. 
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cases centered only on the Clean Air Act.65 Where these factors are absent 
and the facts of a particular case are compelling, attempts to secure preen- 
forcement review may be successful. Indeed, later cases have shown an in- 
clination to consider it.66 Because of the threat of treble damages for failure 
to comply with section 106 Superfund administrative orders, courts should 
be particularly willing to review them. Where litigation is inevitable, 
preemptive actions allow the plaintiff to commence the action at a forum 
and at a time of its choosing, giving it some control over the litigation. 
G .  Diverting Litigation 
Some prospective defendants have initiated litigation on related matters, 
e.g., a broad challenge to the propriety of gathering evidence by aerial 
ph~tography.~ '  This type of litigation could be used either to divert the 
government's resources from its original goal of suing the potential defen- 
dant or to demonstrate that trifling with the potential defendant can be very 
costly to the government, e.g., running the risk of being enjoined from 
aerial photography. As a diversion tactic, such litigation alone is a waste of 
resources and it will seldom consume sufficient resources of the government 
to divert it from its contemplated enforcement action. Combined with other 
tactics reviewed here, however, it may be valuable. As a scare tactic, it is not 
recommended. The government does not react well to implied threats. 
H .  Making Information Requests 
Use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gather as much information 
as possible about the government's case, its evidence, its related policies and 
procedures, and the scientific and technical justification for its conclusions 
and demands. Gather the same information through others that are willing 
to cooperate, e.g., states, congressmen, etc. Such information may reveal 
weaknesses or vulnerability in the government's case, and gathering it does 
temporarily divert government resources. Refusal to furnish information 
requested under the FOIA may present a good opportunity for diverting 
litigation. 
I. Aggressive Disco very 
The government is not accustomed to aggressive discovery in environmental 
cases. Its employees are not all well-disciplined, and some may reveal infor- 
mation damaging to the government's case on deposition. The gov- 
ernment's records are sometimes poorly kept, and it may have difficulty in 
%etty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1975) (declaratory judgment 
request really sought review of underlying rulemaking); West Penn Power Company v. Train, 
522 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1975) (notice of violation not final agency action); Lloyd A.  Frye Roof- 
ing Co. v. U.S. E.P.A.,  554 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ind. 1973). 
66Hooker Chemical Co. v. E.P.A.,  642 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir. 1981); Conoco, Inc. v .  Garde- 
bring, 503 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. 111. 1980). 
"Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 50 U.S.L.W. 2651 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
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complying with exhaustive requests for documents, leaving possibly 
grounds for motions to compel complete discovery under Rule 37 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and giving the judge a poor impression of 
the government's case and professionalism. 
Enforcement action by the government to remedy damage or prevent 
potential damage from hazardous wastes will continue to increase over the 
next several years. The defendants that deal most successfully with it will be 
those that anticipate it and, site by site, develop defensive strategies before 
the government takes action against them. Framed in response to a broad 
array of considerations and drawing on an equally broad array of tactics, 
good defensive strategies will minimize and in some cases avoid liability. 
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